# optional: after how many files to update progress #show_progress_every: 100 # optional: plugins directory name #plugins_dir: 'plugins' # optional: plugins discovery name pattern plugin_name_pattern: '*.py' # optional: terminal escape sequences to display colors #output_colors: # DEFAULT: '\033[0m' # HEADER: '\033[95m' # LOW: '\033[94m' # MEDIUM: '\033[93m' # HIGH: '\033[91m' # optional: log format string #log_format: "[%(module)s]\t%(levelname)s\t%(message)s" # globs of files which should be analyzed include: - '*.py' - '*.pyw' # a list of strings, which if found in the path will cause files to be excluded # for example /tests/ - to remove all all files in tests directory exclude_dirs: - '/tests/' profiles: gate: include: - any_other_function_with_shell_equals_true - assert_used - blacklist_calls - blacklist_import_func # One of the blacklisted imports is the subprocess module. Keystone # has to import the subprocess module in a single module for # eventlet support so in most cases bandit won't be able to detect # that subprocess is even being imported. Also, Bandit's # recommendation is just to check that the use is safe without any # documentation on what safe or unsafe usage is. So this test is # skipped. # - blacklist_imports - exec_used - execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true # - hardcoded_bind_all_interfaces # TODO: enable this test # Not working because wordlist/default-passwords file not bundled, # see https://bugs.launchpad.net/bandit/+bug/1451575 : # - hardcoded_password # Not used because it's prone to false positives: # - hardcoded_sql_expressions # - hardcoded_tmp_directory # TODO: enable this test - jinja2_autoescape_false - linux_commands_wildcard_injection - paramiko_calls - password_config_option_not_marked_secret - request_with_no_cert_validation - set_bad_file_permissions - subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true # - subprocess_without_shell_equals_true # TODO: enable this test - start_process_with_a_shell # - start_process_with_no_shell # TODO: enable this test - start_process_with_partial_path - ssl_with_bad_defaults - ssl_with_bad_version - ssl_with_no_version # - try_except_pass # TODO: enable this test - use_of_mako_templates blacklist_calls: bad_name_sets: # - pickle: # qualnames: [pickle.loads, pickle.load, pickle.Unpickler, # cPickle.loads, cPickle.load, cPickle.Unpickler] # message: "Pickle library appears to be in use, possible security issue." # TODO: enable this test - marshal: qualnames: [marshal.load, marshal.loads] message: "Deserialization with the marshal module is possibly dangerous." # - md5: # qualnames: [hashlib.md5, Crypto.Hash.MD2.new, Crypto.Hash.MD4.new, Crypto.Hash.MD5.new, cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.MD5] # message: "Use of insecure MD2, MD4, or MD5 hash function." # TODO: enable this test - mktemp_q: qualnames: [tempfile.mktemp] message: "Use of insecure and deprecated function (mktemp)." - eval: qualnames: [eval] message: "Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval." - mark_safe: names: [mark_safe] message: "Use of mark_safe() may expose cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and should be reviewed." - httpsconnection: qualnames: [httplib.HTTPSConnection] message: "Use of HTTPSConnection does not provide security, see https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0033" - yaml_load: qualnames: [yaml.load] message: "Use of unsafe yaml load. Allows instantiation of arbitrary objects. Consider yaml.safe_load()." - urllib_urlopen: qualnames: [urllib.urlopen, urllib.urlretrieve, urllib.URLopener, urllib.FancyURLopener, urllib2.urlopen, urllib2.Request] message: "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected." - random: qualnames: [random.random, random.randrange, random.randint, random.choice, random.uniform, random.triangular] message: "Standard pseudo-random generators are not suitable for security/cryptographic purposes." level: "LOW" # Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml: # https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax # TODO(jaegerandi): Enable once defusedxml is in global requirements. #- xml_bad_cElementTree: # qualnames: [xml.etree.cElementTree.parse, # xml.etree.cElementTree.iterparse, # xml.etree.cElementTree.fromstring, # xml.etree.cElementTree.XMLParser] # message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." #- xml_bad_ElementTree: # qualnames: [xml.etree.ElementTree.parse, # xml.etree.ElementTree.iterparse, # xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring, # xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser] # message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." - xml_bad_expatreader: qualnames: [xml.sax.expatreader.create_parser] message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." - xml_bad_expatbuilder: qualnames: [xml.dom.expatbuilder.parse, xml.dom.expatbuilder.parseString] message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." - xml_bad_sax: qualnames: [xml.sax.parse, xml.sax.parseString, xml.sax.make_parser] message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." - xml_bad_minidom: qualnames: [xml.dom.minidom.parse, xml.dom.minidom.parseString] message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." - xml_bad_pulldom: qualnames: [xml.dom.pulldom.parse, xml.dom.pulldom.parseString] message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." - xml_bad_etree: qualnames: [lxml.etree.parse, lxml.etree.fromstring, lxml.etree.RestrictedElement, lxml.etree.GlobalParserTLS, lxml.etree.getDefaultParser, lxml.etree.check_docinfo] message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function." shell_injection: # Start a process using the subprocess module, or one of its wrappers. subprocess: [subprocess.Popen, subprocess.call, subprocess.check_call, subprocess.check_output, utils.execute, utils.execute_with_timeout] # Start a process with a function vulnerable to shell injection. shell: [os.system, os.popen, os.popen2, os.popen3, os.popen4, popen2.popen2, popen2.popen3, popen2.popen4, popen2.Popen3, popen2.Popen4, commands.getoutput, commands.getstatusoutput] # Start a process with a function that is not vulnerable to shell injection. no_shell: [os.execl, os.execle, os.execlp, os.execlpe, os.execv,os.execve, os.execvp, os.execvpe, os.spawnl, os.spawnle, os.spawnlp, os.spawnlpe, os.spawnv, os.spawnve, os.spawnvp, os.spawnvpe, os.startfile] blacklist_imports: bad_import_sets: - telnet: imports: [telnetlib] level: HIGH message: "Telnet is considered insecure. Use SSH or some other encrypted protocol." - info_libs: imports: [pickle, cPickle, subprocess, Crypto] level: LOW message: "Consider possible security implications associated with {module} module." # Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml: # https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax - xml_libs: imports: [xml.etree.cElementTree, xml.etree.ElementTree, xml.sax.expatreader, xml.sax, xml.dom.expatbuilder, xml.dom.minidom, xml.dom.pulldom, lxml.etree, lxml] message: "Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {module} with the equivilent defusedxml package." level: LOW - xml_libs_high: imports: [xmlrpclib] message: "Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Use defused.xmlrpc.monkey_patch() function to monkey-patch xmlrpclib and mitigate XML vulnerabilities." level: HIGH hardcoded_tmp_directory: tmp_dirs: ['/tmp', '/var/tmp', '/dev/shm'] hardcoded_password: # Support for full path, relative path and special "%(site_data_dir)s" # substitution (/usr/{local}/share) word_list: "%(site_data_dir)s/wordlist/default-passwords" ssl_with_bad_version: bad_protocol_versions: - 'PROTOCOL_SSLv2' - 'SSLv2_METHOD' - 'SSLv23_METHOD' - 'PROTOCOL_SSLv3' # strict option - 'PROTOCOL_TLSv1' # strict option - 'SSLv3_METHOD' # strict option - 'TLSv1_METHOD' # strict option password_config_option_not_marked_secret: function_names: - oslo.config.cfg.StrOpt - oslo_config.cfg.StrOpt execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true: function_names: - ceilometer.utils.execute - cinder.utils.execute - neutron.agent.linux.utils.execute - nova.utils.execute - nova.utils.trycmd try_except_pass: check_typed_exception: True