Merge "Cleanup keystone.token.providers.common"

This commit is contained in:
Zuul 2018-08-01 16:57:13 +00:00 committed by Gerrit Code Review
commit 0ab1f91704
9 changed files with 43 additions and 717 deletions

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@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ from keystone.federation import constants as federation_constants
from keystone.federation import utils
from keystone.i18n import _
from keystone.models import token_model
from keystone.token.providers import common
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF
LOG = log.getLogger(__name__)
@ -83,12 +82,11 @@ class AuthContextMiddleware(provider_api.ProviderAPIMixin,
auth_context['roles'] = user_ref['roles']
else:
# it's the local user, so token data is needed.
token_helper = common.V3TokenDataHelper()
token_data = token_helper.get_token_data(
user_id=user_ref['id'],
method_names=[CONF.tokenless_auth.protocol],
domain_id=domain_id,
project_id=project_id)
token = token_model.TokenModel()
token.user_id = user_ref['id']
token.methods = [CONF.tokenless_auth.protocol]
token.domain_id = domain_id
token.project_id = project_id
auth_context = {'user_id': user_ref['id']}
auth_context['is_delegated_auth'] = False
@ -96,8 +94,7 @@ class AuthContextMiddleware(provider_api.ProviderAPIMixin,
auth_context['domain_id'] = domain_id
if project_id:
auth_context['project_id'] = project_id
auth_context['roles'] = [role['name'] for role
in token_data['token']['roles']]
auth_context['roles'] = [role['name'] for role in token.roles]
return auth_context
def _validate_trusted_issuer(self, request):

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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ from keystone.revoke.backends import sql
from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.tests.unit import ksfixtures
from keystone.tests.unit import test_backend_sql
from keystone.token.providers import common
from keystone.token import provider
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ class RevokeTests(object):
# check to make sure that list_events matches the token to the event we
# just revoked.
first_token = _sample_blank_token()
first_token['audit_id'] = common.random_urlsafe_str()
first_token['audit_id'] = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
PROVIDERS.revoke_api.revoke_by_audit_id(
audit_id=first_token['audit_id'])
self._assertTokenRevoked(first_token)
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ class RevokeTests(object):
# sure that list events only finds 1 match since there are 2 and they
# dont both have different populated audit_id fields
second_token = _sample_blank_token()
second_token['audit_id'] = common.random_urlsafe_str()
second_token['audit_id'] = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
PROVIDERS.revoke_api.revoke_by_audit_id(
audit_id=second_token['audit_id'])
self._assertTokenRevoked(second_token)
@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ class RevokeTests(object):
first_token = _sample_blank_token()
first_token['user_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
first_token['project_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
first_token['audit_id'] = common.random_urlsafe_str()
first_token['audit_id'] = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
# revoke event and then verify that there is only one revocation
# and verify the only revoked event is the token
PROVIDERS.revoke_api.revoke(revoke_model.RevokeEvent(
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ class RevokeTests(object):
fourth_token = _sample_blank_token()
fourth_token['user_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
fourth_token['project_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
fourth_token['audit_id'] = common.random_urlsafe_str()
fourth_token['audit_id'] = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
PROVIDERS.revoke_api.revoke(revoke_model.RevokeEvent(
project_id=fourth_token['project_id'],
audit_id=fourth_token['audit_id']))
@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ class RevokeTests(object):
revocation_backend = sql.Revoke()
# Create our first token with audit_id
audit_id = common.build_audit_info(parent_audit_id=None)[0]
audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
token = _sample_blank_token()
# Audit ID and Audit Chain ID are populated with the same value
# if the token is an original token

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@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
import datetime
from oslo_utils import timeutils
from six.moves import urllib
from keystone.common import provider_api
from keystone.common import utils
@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.tests.unit import ksfixtures
from keystone.tests.unit.ksfixtures import database
from keystone import token
from keystone.token import provider
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF
@ -452,6 +454,10 @@ class TestTokenProvider(unit.TestCase):
)
self.load_backends()
def test_strings_are_url_safe(self):
s = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertEqual(s, urllib.parse.quote_plus(s))
def test_unsupported_token_provider(self):
self.config_fixture.config(group='token',
provider='MyProvider')

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@ -33,11 +33,13 @@ if not xmldsig:
xmldsig = importutils.try_import("xmldsig")
from keystone.auth import controllers as auth_controllers
from keystone.common import controller
from keystone.common import provider_api
import keystone.conf
from keystone import exception
from keystone.federation import controllers as federation_controllers
from keystone.federation import idp as keystone_idp
from keystone.models import token_model
from keystone import notifications
from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.tests.unit import core
@ -45,7 +47,6 @@ from keystone.tests.unit import federation_fixtures
from keystone.tests.unit import ksfixtures
from keystone.tests.unit import mapping_fixtures
from keystone.tests.unit import test_v3
from keystone.token.providers import common as token_common
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF
@ -4741,8 +4742,6 @@ class K2KServiceCatalogTests(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
PROVIDERS.federation_api.create_sp(self.SP3, sp)
self.sp_gamma = {self.SP3: sp}
self.token_v3_helper = token_common.V3TokenDataHelper()
def sp_response(self, id, ref):
ref.pop('enabled')
ref.pop('description')
@ -4774,7 +4773,10 @@ class K2KServiceCatalogTests(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
def test_service_providers_in_token(self):
"""Check if service providers are listed in service catalog."""
token = self.token_v3_helper.get_token_data(self.user_id, ['password'])
model = token_model.TokenModel()
model.user_id = self.user_id
model.methods = ['password']
token = controller.render_token_response_from_model(model)
ref = {}
for r in (self.sp_alpha, self.sp_beta, self.sp_gamma):
ref.update(r)
@ -4791,7 +4793,10 @@ class K2KServiceCatalogTests(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
sp_ref = {'enabled': False}
PROVIDERS.federation_api.update_sp(self.SP1, sp_ref)
token = self.token_v3_helper.get_token_data(self.user_id, ['password'])
model = token_model.TokenModel()
model.user_id = self.user_id
model.methods = ['password']
token = controller.render_token_response_from_model(model)
ref = {}
for r in (self.sp_beta, self.sp_gamma):
ref.update(r)
@ -4808,7 +4813,10 @@ class K2KServiceCatalogTests(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
for sp in (self.SP1, self.SP2, self.SP3):
PROVIDERS.federation_api.update_sp(sp, sp_ref)
token = self.token_v3_helper.get_token_data(self.user_id, ['password'])
model = token_model.TokenModel()
model.user_id = self.user_id
model.methods = ['password']
token = controller.render_token_response_from_model(model)
self.assertNotIn('service_providers', token['token'],
message=('Expected Service Catalog not to have '
'service_providers'))

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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
import uuid
from six.moves import urllib
from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.token import provider
from keystone.token.providers import common
class TestTokenProvidersCommon(unit.TestCase):
def test_strings_are_url_safe(self):
s = common.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertEqual(s, urllib.parse.quote_plus(s))
def test_unsupported_provider_raises_import_error(self):
namespace = "keystone.token.provider"
# Generate a random name
driver = uuid.uuid4().hex
self.config_fixture.config(group='token', provider=driver)
msg = "Unable to find '%(driver)s' driver in '%(namespace)s'." % {
'namespace': namespace, 'driver': driver
}
self.assertRaisesRegex(ImportError, msg, provider.Manager)

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ from keystone.federation import constants as federation_constants
from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.tests.unit import ksfixtures
from keystone.tests.unit.ksfixtures import database
from keystone.token.providers import common
from keystone.token import provider
from keystone.token.providers import fernet
from keystone.token import token_formatters
@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ class TestPayloads(unit.TestCase):
delta=1e-05)
def test_strings_can_be_converted_to_bytes(self):
s = common.random_urlsafe_str()
s = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertIsInstance(s, six.text_type)
b = token_formatters.BasePayload.random_urlsafe_str_to_bytes(s)
@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ class TestPayloads(unit.TestCase):
exp_user_id = exp_user_id or uuid.uuid4().hex
exp_methods = exp_methods or ['password']
exp_expires_at = utils.isotime(timeutils.utcnow(), subsecond=True)
exp_audit_ids = [common.random_urlsafe_str()]
exp_audit_ids = [provider.random_urlsafe_str()]
payload = payload_class.assemble(
exp_user_id, exp_methods, exp_system, exp_project_id,

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@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
import base64
import uuid
from testtools import matchers
from keystone import exception
from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.token.providers import common
class TestTokenDataHelper(unit.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
super(TestTokenDataHelper, self).setUp()
self.load_backends()
self.v3_data_helper = common.V3TokenDataHelper()
def test_v3_token_data_helper_populate_audit_info_string(self):
token_data = {}
audit_info_bytes = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(uuid.uuid4().bytes)[:-2]
audit_info = audit_info_bytes.decode('utf-8')
self.v3_data_helper._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info)
self.assertIn(audit_info, token_data['audit_ids'])
self.assertThat(token_data['audit_ids'], matchers.HasLength(2))
def test_v3_token_data_helper_populate_audit_info_none(self):
token_data = {}
self.v3_data_helper._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info=None)
self.assertThat(token_data['audit_ids'], matchers.HasLength(1))
self.assertNotIn(None, token_data['audit_ids'])
def test_v3_token_data_helper_populate_audit_info_list(self):
token_data = {}
audit_info = [base64.urlsafe_b64encode(uuid.uuid4().bytes)[:-2],
base64.urlsafe_b64encode(uuid.uuid4().bytes)[:-2]]
self.v3_data_helper._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info)
self.assertEqual(audit_info, token_data['audit_ids'])
def test_v3_token_data_helper_populate_audit_info_invalid(self):
token_data = {}
audit_info = dict()
self.assertRaises(exception.UnexpectedError,
self.v3_data_helper._populate_audit_info,
token_data=token_data,
audit_info=audit_info)

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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ from keystone.models import token_model
from keystone.tests.unit import base_classes
from keystone.tests.unit import core
from keystone.tests.unit import test_token_provider
from keystone.token.providers import common as provider_common
from keystone.token import provider
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF
PROVIDERS = provider_api.ProviderAPIs
@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ class TokenModelTests(base_classes.TestCaseWithBootstrap):
def test_audit_id_attributes(self):
token = token_model.TokenModel()
audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
token.audit_id = audit_id
self.assertTrue(len(token.audit_ids) == 1)
parent_audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
parent_audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
token.parent_audit_id = parent_audit_id
self.assertTrue(len(token.audit_ids) == 2)
@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ class TokenModelTests(base_classes.TestCaseWithBootstrap):
token = token_model.TokenModel()
token.user_id = user['id']
token.system = 'all'
token.audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
token.audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertRaises(
exception.Unauthorized, token.mint, self.token_id, self.issued_at
@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ class TokenModelTests(base_classes.TestCaseWithBootstrap):
token = token_model.TokenModel()
token.user_id = user['id']
token.domain_id = CONF.identity.default_domain_id
token.audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
token.audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertRaises(
exception.Unauthorized, token.mint, self.token_id, self.issued_at
@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ class TokenModelTests(base_classes.TestCaseWithBootstrap):
token = token_model.TokenModel()
token.user_id = user['id']
token.project_id = self.project_id
token.audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
token.audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertRaises(
exception.Unauthorized, token.mint, self.token_id, self.issued_at
@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ class TokenModelTests(base_classes.TestCaseWithBootstrap):
token = token_model.TokenModel()
token.user_id = self.admin_user_id
token.project_id = self.project_id
token.audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
token.audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertRaises(
exception.ProjectNotFound, token.mint, self.token_id,
@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ class TokenModelTests(base_classes.TestCaseWithBootstrap):
token = token_model.TokenModel()
token.user_id = self.admin_user_id
token.project_id = self.project_id
token.audit_id = provider_common.random_urlsafe_str()
token.audit_id = provider.random_urlsafe_str()
self.assertRaises(
exception.DomainNotFound, token.mint, self.token_id, self.issued_at

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@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 2013 OpenStack Foundation
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
from __future__ import absolute_import
import base64
import datetime
import itertools
import uuid
from oslo_log import log
from oslo_serialization import jsonutils
from oslo_utils import timeutils
import six
from six.moves.urllib import parse
from keystone.common import provider_api
from keystone.common import utils
import keystone.conf
from keystone import exception
from keystone.federation import constants as federation_constants
from keystone.i18n import _
from keystone.models import token_model
from keystone.token.providers import base
LOG = log.getLogger(__name__)
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF
PROVIDERS = provider_api.ProviderAPIs
def default_expire_time():
"""Determine when a fresh token should expire.
Expiration time varies based on configuration (see ``[token] expiration``).
:returns: a naive UTC datetime.datetime object
"""
expire_delta = datetime.timedelta(seconds=CONF.token.expiration)
expires_at = timeutils.utcnow() + expire_delta
return expires_at.replace(microsecond=0)
def random_urlsafe_str():
"""Generate a random URL-safe string.
:rtype: six.text_type
"""
# chop the padding (==) off the end of the encoding to save space
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(uuid.uuid4().bytes)[:-2].decode('utf-8')
def build_audit_info(parent_audit_id=None):
"""Build the audit data for a token.
If ``parent_audit_id`` is None, the list will be one element in length
containing a newly generated audit_id.
If ``parent_audit_id`` is supplied, the list will be two elements in length
containing a newly generated audit_id and the ``parent_audit_id``. The
``parent_audit_id`` will always be element index 1 in the resulting
list.
:param parent_audit_id: the audit of the original token in the chain
:type parent_audit_id: str
:returns: Keystone token audit data
"""
audit_id = random_urlsafe_str()
if parent_audit_id is not None:
return [audit_id, parent_audit_id]
return [audit_id]
class V3TokenDataHelper(provider_api.ProviderAPIMixin, object):
"""Token data helper."""
def __init__(self):
# Keep __init__ around to ensure dependency injection works.
super(V3TokenDataHelper, self).__init__()
def _get_filtered_domain(self, domain_id):
"""Ensure the domain is enabled and return domain id and name.
:param domain_id: The ID of the domain to validate
:returns: A dictionary containing two keys, the `id` of the domain and
the `name` of the domain.
"""
domain_ref = PROVIDERS.resource_api.get_domain(domain_id)
if not domain_ref.get('enabled'):
msg = _('Unable to validate token because domain %(id)s is '
'disabled') % {'id': domain_ref['id']}
LOG.warning(msg)
raise exception.DomainNotFound(msg)
return {'id': domain_ref['id'], 'name': domain_ref['name']}
def _get_filtered_project(self, project_id):
"""Ensure the project and parent domain is enabled.
:param project_id: The ID of the project to validate
:return: A dictionary containing up to three keys, the `id` of the
project, the `name` of the project, and the parent `domain`.
"""
project_ref = PROVIDERS.resource_api.get_project(project_id)
if not project_ref.get('enabled'):
msg = _('Unable to validate token because project %(id)s is '
'disabled') % {'id': project_ref['id']}
LOG.warning(msg)
raise exception.ProjectNotFound(msg)
filtered_project = {
'id': project_ref['id'],
'name': project_ref['name']}
if project_ref['domain_id'] is not None:
filtered_project['domain'] = (
self._get_filtered_domain(project_ref['domain_id']))
else:
# Projects acting as a domain do not have a domain_id attribute
filtered_project['domain'] = None
return filtered_project
def _populate_scope(self, token_data, system, domain_id, project_id):
if 'domain' in token_data or 'project' in token_data:
# scope already exist, no need to populate it again
return
if domain_id:
token_data['domain'] = self._get_filtered_domain(domain_id)
elif project_id:
token_data['project'] = self._get_filtered_project(project_id)
project_ref = PROVIDERS.resource_api.get_project(project_id)
token_data['is_domain'] = project_ref['is_domain']
elif system == 'all':
# NOTE(lbragstad): This might have to be more elegant in the future
# if, or when, keystone supports scoping a token to a specific
# service or region.
token_data['system'] = {'all': True}
def _populate_is_admin_project(self, token_data):
# TODO(ayoung): Support the ability for a project acting as a domain
# to be the admin project once the rest of the code for projects
# acting as domains is merged. Code will likely be:
# (r.admin_project_name == None and project['is_domain'] == True
# and project['name'] == r.admin_project_domain_name)
admin_project_name = CONF.resource.admin_project_name
admin_project_domain_name = CONF.resource.admin_project_domain_name
if not (admin_project_name and admin_project_domain_name):
return # admin project not enabled
project = token_data['project']
token_data['is_admin_project'] = (
project['name'] == admin_project_name and
project['domain']['name'] == admin_project_domain_name)
def _get_roles_for_user(self, user_id, system, domain_id, project_id):
roles = []
if system:
group_ids = [
group['id'] for
group in PROVIDERS.identity_api.list_groups_for_user(user_id)
]
group_roles = []
for group_id in group_ids:
roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.list_system_grants_for_group(
group_id
)
for role in roles:
group_roles.append(role)
user_roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.list_system_grants_for_user(
user_id
)
return itertools.chain(group_roles, user_roles)
if domain_id:
roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_domain(
user_id, domain_id)
if project_id:
roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_project(
user_id, project_id)
return [PROVIDERS.role_api.get_role(role_id) for role_id in roles]
def _get_app_cred_roles(self, app_cred, user_id, domain_id, project_id):
roles = app_cred['roles']
token_roles = []
for role in roles:
try:
role_ref = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.get_grant(
role['id'], user_id=user_id, domain_id=domain_id,
project_id=project_id)
token_roles.append(role_ref)
except exception.RoleAssignmentNotFound:
pass
return [
PROVIDERS.role_api.get_role(role['id']) for role in token_roles]
def populate_roles_for_federated_user(self, token_data, group_ids,
project_id=None, domain_id=None,
user_id=None, system=None):
"""Populate roles basing on provided groups and assignments.
Used for federated users with dynamically assigned groups.
This method does not return anything, yet it modifies token_data in
place.
:param token_data: a dictionary used for building token response
:param group_ids: list of group IDs a user is a member of
:param project_id: project ID to scope to
:param domain_id: domain ID to scope to
:param user_id: user ID
:param system: system scope if applicable
:raises keystone.exception.Unauthorized: when no roles were found
"""
def check_roles(roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id):
# User was granted roles so simply exit this function.
if roles:
return
if project_id:
msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access '
'to project %(project_id)s') % {
'user_id': user_id,
'project_id': project_id}
elif domain_id:
msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access '
'to domain %(domain_id)s') % {
'user_id': user_id,
'domain_id': domain_id}
# Since no roles were found a user is not authorized to
# perform any operations. Raise an exception with
# appropriate error message.
raise exception.Unauthorized(msg)
roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.get_roles_for_groups(
group_ids, project_id, domain_id
)
roles = roles + self._get_roles_for_user(
user_id, system, domain_id, project_id
)
# NOTE(lbragstad): Remove duplicate role references from a list of
# roles. It is often suggested that this be done with:
#
# roles = [dict(t) for t in set([tuple(d.items()) for d in roles])]
#
# But that doesn't actually remove duplicates in all cases and causes
# transient failures because dictionaries are unordered objects. This
# means {'id': 1, 'foo': 'bar'} and {'foo': 'bar', 'id': 1} won't
# actually resolve to a single entity in the above logic since they are
# both considered unique. By using `in` we're performing a containment
# check, which also does a deep comparison of the objects, which is
# what we want.
unique_roles = []
for role in roles:
if role not in unique_roles:
unique_roles.append(role)
check_roles(unique_roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id)
token_data['roles'] = unique_roles
def _populate_user(self, token_data, user_id, trust):
if 'user' in token_data:
# no need to repopulate user if it already exists
return
user_ref = PROVIDERS.identity_api.get_user(user_id)
if trust and 'OS-TRUST:trust' not in token_data:
trustor_user_ref = (PROVIDERS.identity_api.get_user(
trust['trustor_user_id']))
trustee_user_ref = (PROVIDERS.identity_api.get_user(
trust['trustee_user_id']))
try:
PROVIDERS.resource_api.assert_domain_enabled(
trustor_user_ref['domain_id'])
except AssertionError:
raise exception.TokenNotFound(_('Trustor domain is disabled.'))
try:
PROVIDERS.resource_api.assert_domain_enabled(
trustee_user_ref['domain_id'])
except AssertionError:
raise exception.TokenNotFound(_('Trustee domain is disabled.'))
try:
PROVIDERS.identity_api.assert_user_enabled(
trust['trustor_user_id']
)
except AssertionError:
raise exception.Forbidden(_('Trustor is disabled.'))
if trust['impersonation']:
user_ref = trustor_user_ref
token_data['OS-TRUST:trust'] = (
{
'id': trust['id'],
'trustor_user': {'id': trust['trustor_user_id']},
'trustee_user': {'id': trust['trustee_user_id']},
'impersonation': trust['impersonation']
})
filtered_user = {
'id': user_ref['id'],
'name': user_ref['name'],
'domain': self._get_filtered_domain(user_ref['domain_id']),
'password_expires_at': user_ref['password_expires_at']}
token_data['user'] = filtered_user
def _populate_oauth_section(self, token_data, access_token):
if access_token:
access_token_id = access_token['id']
consumer_id = access_token['consumer_id']
token_data['OS-OAUTH1'] = ({'access_token_id': access_token_id,
'consumer_id': consumer_id})
def _populate_roles(self, token_data, user_id, system, domain_id,
project_id, trust, app_cred_id, access_token):
if 'roles' in token_data:
# no need to repopulate roles
return
if access_token:
filtered_roles = []
access_token_ref = PROVIDERS.oauth_api.get_access_token(
access_token['id']
)
authed_role_ids = jsonutils.loads(access_token_ref['role_ids'])
all_roles = PROVIDERS.role_api.list_roles()
for role in all_roles:
for authed_role in authed_role_ids:
if authed_role == role['id']:
filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'],
'name': role['name']})
token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles
return
if trust:
# If redelegated_trust_id is set, then we must traverse the
# trust_chain in order to determine who the original trustor is. We
# need to do this because the user ID of the original trustor helps
# us determine scope in the redelegated context.
if trust.get('redelegated_trust_id'):
trust_chain = PROVIDERS.trust_api.get_trust_pedigree(
trust['id']
)
token_user_id = trust_chain[-1]['trustor_user_id']
else:
token_user_id = trust['trustor_user_id']
token_project_id = trust['project_id']
# trusts do not support domains yet
token_domain_id = None
else:
token_user_id = user_id
token_project_id = project_id
token_domain_id = domain_id
if system or token_domain_id or token_project_id:
filtered_roles = []
if trust:
# First expand out any roles that were in the trust to include
# any implied roles, whether global or domain specific
refs = [{'role_id': role['id']} for role in trust['roles']]
effective_trust_roles = (
PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_implied_roles(refs))
effective_trust_role_ids = (
set([r['role_id'] for r in effective_trust_roles])
)
# Now get the current role assignments for the trustor,
# including any domain specific roles.
assignments = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.list_role_assignments(
user_id=token_user_id,
system=system,
project_id=token_project_id,
effective=True, strip_domain_roles=False)
current_effective_trustor_roles = (
set([x['role_id'] for x in assignments]))
# Go through each of the effective trust roles, making sure the
# trustor still has them, if any have been removed, then we
# will treat the trust as invalid
for trust_role_id in effective_trust_role_ids:
if trust_role_id in current_effective_trustor_roles:
role = PROVIDERS.role_api.get_role(trust_role_id)
if role['domain_id'] is None:
filtered_roles.append(role)
else:
raise exception.Forbidden(
_('Trustee has no delegated roles.'))
elif app_cred_id:
app_cred_api = PROVIDERS.application_credential_api
app_cred_ref = app_cred_api.get_application_credential(
app_cred_id)
for role in self._get_app_cred_roles(app_cred_ref,
token_user_id,
token_domain_id,
token_project_id):
filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'],
'name': role['name']})
else:
for role in self._get_roles_for_user(token_user_id,
system,
token_domain_id,
token_project_id):
filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'],
'name': role['name']})
# user has no project or domain roles, therefore access denied
if not filtered_roles:
if token_project_id:
msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access '
'to project %(project_id)s') % {
'user_id': user_id,
'project_id': token_project_id}
elif token_domain_id:
msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access '
'to domain %(domain_id)s') % {
'user_id': user_id,
'domain_id': token_domain_id}
elif system:
msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access '
'to the system') % {'user_id': user_id}
LOG.debug(msg)
raise exception.Unauthorized(msg)
token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles
def _populate_service_catalog(self, token_data, user_id, system, domain_id,
project_id, trust):
if 'catalog' in token_data:
# no need to repopulate service catalog
return
if trust:
user_id = trust['trustor_user_id']
# NOTE(lbragstad): The catalog API requires a project in order to
# generate a service catalog, but that appears to be only if there are
# endpoint -> project relationships. In the event we're dealing with a
# system_scoped token, we should pass None to the catalog API and just
# get a catalog anyway.
if project_id or domain_id or system:
service_catalog = PROVIDERS.catalog_api.get_v3_catalog(
user_id, project_id)
token_data['catalog'] = service_catalog
def _populate_service_providers(self, token_data):
if 'service_providers' in token_data:
return
service_providers = (
PROVIDERS.federation_api.get_enabled_service_providers()
)
if service_providers:
token_data['service_providers'] = service_providers
def _validate_identity_provider(self, token_data):
federated_info = token_data['user'].get('OS-FEDERATION')
if federated_info:
idp_id = federated_info['identity_provider']['id']
# FIXME(lbragstad): This isn't working properly because somewhere
# along the line we *were* encoding and decoding properly. This
# is needed to get some tests to pass in python 3. This will likely
# be fixed when the validate token path is moved over to using the
# token model, just like authenticate.
if isinstance(idp_id, bytes):
idp_id = idp_id.decode('utf-8')
PROVIDERS.federation_api.get_idp(idp_id)
def _populate_token_dates(self, token_data, expires=None, issued_at=None):
if not expires:
expires = default_expire_time()
if not isinstance(expires, six.string_types):
expires = utils.isotime(expires, subsecond=True)
token_data['expires_at'] = expires
token_data['issued_at'] = (issued_at or
utils.isotime(subsecond=True))
def _populate_audit_info(self, token_data, audit_info=None):
if audit_info is None or isinstance(audit_info, six.string_types):
token_data['audit_ids'] = build_audit_info(audit_info)
elif isinstance(audit_info, list):
token_data['audit_ids'] = audit_info
else:
msg = (_('Invalid audit info data type: %(data)s (%(type)s)') %
{'data': audit_info, 'type': type(audit_info)})
LOG.error(msg)
raise exception.UnexpectedError(msg)
def _populate_app_cred(self, token_data, app_cred_id):
if app_cred_id:
app_cred_api = PROVIDERS.application_credential_api
app_cred = app_cred_api.get_application_credential(app_cred_id)
restricted = not app_cred['unrestricted']
token_data['application_credential'] = {}
token_data['application_credential']['id'] = app_cred['id']
token_data['application_credential']['name'] = app_cred['name']
token_data['application_credential']['restricted'] = restricted
def get_token_data(self, user_id, method_names, system=None,
domain_id=None, project_id=None, expires=None,
app_cred_id=None, trust=None, token=None,
include_catalog=True, bind=None, access_token=None,
issued_at=None, audit_info=None):
token_data = {'methods': method_names}
# We've probably already written these to the token
if token:
for x in ('roles', 'user', 'catalog', 'project', 'domain'):
if x in token:
token_data[x] = token[x]
if bind:
token_data['bind'] = bind
self._populate_scope(token_data, system, domain_id, project_id)
if token_data.get('project'):
self._populate_is_admin_project(token_data)
self._populate_user(token_data, user_id, trust)
self._populate_roles(token_data, user_id, system, domain_id,
project_id, trust, app_cred_id, access_token)
self._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info)
if include_catalog:
self._populate_service_catalog(
token_data, user_id, system, domain_id, project_id, trust
)
self._populate_service_providers(token_data)
self._validate_identity_provider(token_data)
self._populate_token_dates(token_data, expires=expires,
issued_at=issued_at)
self._populate_oauth_section(token_data, access_token)
self._populate_app_cred(token_data, app_cred_id)
return {'token': token_data}
class BaseProvider(provider_api.ProviderAPIMixin, base.Provider):
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
super(BaseProvider, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self.v3_token_data_helper = V3TokenDataHelper()
def get_token_version(self, token_data):
if token_data and isinstance(token_data, dict):
if 'token_version' in token_data:
if token_data['token_version'] in token_model.VERSIONS:
return token_data['token_version']
if 'token' in token_data and 'methods' in token_data['token']:
return token_model.V3
raise exception.UnsupportedTokenVersionException()
def _is_mapped_token(self, auth_context):
return (federation_constants.IDENTITY_PROVIDER in auth_context and
federation_constants.PROTOCOL in auth_context)
def _handle_mapped_tokens(self, auth_context, project_id, domain_id):
user_id = auth_context['user_id']
group_ids = auth_context['group_ids']
idp = auth_context[federation_constants.IDENTITY_PROVIDER]
protocol = auth_context[federation_constants.PROTOCOL]
user_dict = PROVIDERS.identity_api.get_user(user_id)
user_name = user_dict['name']
token_data = {
'user': {
'id': user_id,
'name': parse.unquote(user_name),
federation_constants.FEDERATION: {
'groups': [{'id': x} for x in group_ids],
'identity_provider': {'id': idp},
'protocol': {'id': protocol}
},
'domain': {
'id': CONF.federation.federated_domain_name,
'name': CONF.federation.federated_domain_name
}
}
}
# FIXME(lbragstad): This will have to account for system-scoping, too.
if project_id or domain_id:
self.v3_token_data_helper.populate_roles_for_federated_user(
token_data, group_ids, project_id, domain_id, user_id)
return token_data