Remove vulnerability:managed tag references

The TC has decided to no longer continue the "governance tags"
experiment, so the VMT has moved the repos and expectations
previously tracked by that tag into the security site. Overhaul the
security review instructions to refer to the correct location and
structure for this information, as well as a long-overdue cleanup of
references to the no longer extant OSSP.

Change-Id: I1a172016014b64d88199faaff6a6414aae50ccee

security-guide/source/security-review.rst

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@ Security review
 ===============
 
 The goal of security review in the OpenStack community is to identify
-weaknesses in design or implementation of OpenStack projects. While rare,
-these weaknesses could potentially have catastrophic effects on the security of
-an OpenStack deployment, and therefore work should be undertaken to minimize
-the likelihood of these defects in released projects. The OpenStack Security
-Project asserts that once a security review of a project has been completed,
-the following are known and documented:
+weaknesses in design or implementation of OpenStack projects. While rare, these
+weaknesses could potentially have catastrophic effects on the security of an
+OpenStack deployment, and therefore work should be undertaken to minimize the
+likelihood of these defects in released projects. Over the course of a security
+review, the following should be known and documented:
 
 - All entry points into a system
 - What assets are at risk
@@ -19,43 +18,35 @@ the following are known and documented:
 - An agreed set of findings and/or defects
 - How the project interacts with external dependencies
 
-A common reason to perform a security review on an OpenStack project is to
-enable that project to achieve the *vulnerability:managed* governance tag. The
-OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team (VMT) applies the
-`vulnerability:managed tag
-<https://governance.openstack.org/reference/tags/vulnerability_managed.html>`_
-to projects where the report reception and disclosure of vulnerabilities is
-managed by the VMT. One of the requirements for gaining the tag is that
-some form of security review, audit or threat analysis has been performed on
-the project.
+A common reason to perform a security review on an OpenStack deliverable
+repository is to assist with Vulnerability Management Team (VMT) oversight. The
+OpenStack VMT lists `overseen repositories
+<https://security.openstack.org/repos-overseen.html>`_ where the report
+reception and disclosure of vulnerabilities is managed by the VMT. While not a
+strict requirement, some form of security review, audit or threat analysis
+helps everyone more easily pinpoint areas where a system is more prone to
+vulnerabilities and solve them before they become a problem for users.
 
-The OpenStack Security Project (OSSP) has worked with the VMT to agree that an
-architectural review of the best practice deployment for a project is an
-appropriate form of security review, balancing the need for review with the
-resource requirements for a project of the scale of OpenStack. Security
-architecture review is also often referred to as *threat analysis*, *security
-analysis* or *threat modeling*. In the context of OpenStack security review,
-these terms are synonymous for an architectural security review which may
-identify defects in the design of a project or reference architecture, and may
-lead to further investigative work to verify parts of the implementation.
+The OpenStack VMT suggests that an architectural review of the recommended
+deployment for a project is an appropriate form of security review, balancing
+the need for review with the resource requirements for a project of the scale
+of OpenStack. Security architecture review is also often referred to as *threat
+analysis*, *security analysis* or *threat modeling*. In the context of
+OpenStack security review, these terms are synonymous for an architectural
+security review which may identify defects in the design of a project or
+reference architecture, and may lead to further investigative work to verify
+parts of the implementation.
 
-There are two routes that an OpenStack project may take to complete a security
-review:
-
-#. Review by OpenStack Security Project
-#. Review by a third party review body, with validation from the OpenStack
-   Security Project
-
-Security review by the OSSP is expected to be the normal route for new projects
-and for cases where third parties have not performed security reviews or are
-unable to share their results. Information for projects that require a security
-review by the OSSP will be available in the upcoming security review process.
+Security review is expected to be the normal route for new projects and for
+cases where third parties have not performed security reviews or are unable to
+share their results. Information for projects that require a security review
+will be available in the upcoming security review process.
 
 In cases where a security review has already been performed by a third party,
 or where a project prefers to use a third party to perform their review,
 information on how to take the output of that third party review and submit it
-to the OSSP for validation will be available in the upcoming third party
-security review process.
+for validation will be available in the upcoming third party security review
+process.
 
 In either case, the requirements for documentation artefacts are similar - the
 project must provide an architecture diagram for a best practise deployment.