Define a set of basic default roles

With the recent work to keystone and oslo.policy, we should be able to
offer tooling to project development teams so they can start evolving
their policies. Before we start changing things, we should come to
consensus on a set of defaults we should offer out of the box.

Moving towards a set of known defaults will make maintenance for
operators much easier. It will also build the foundation for a more
robust RBAC system that is better at modeling complex
organization, ultimately being more useful in the real-world.

Change-Id: Ia6ddf64b4483a73ab79c86d5d794cce561aa19e0
Co-authored-By: Lance Bragstad <lbragstad@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Jamie Lennox <jamielennox@gmail.com>
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Harry Rybacki 2018-05-04 14:21:30 -04:00
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===================
Basic Default Roles
===================
`blueprint basic-default-roles <https://blueprints.launchpad.net/openstack/+spec/basic-default-roles>`_
Managing `Role Based Access Control
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Role-Based-Access-Control>`_ (RBAC) across
OpenStack is one of the hardest pain points for operators to deal with. It is
not uncommon for operators to have to dig through source code and keep notes
about oddities in RBAC implementations across OpenStack just to offer basic
RBAC capabilities to their customers. End users are also affected because it is
very rare for any two deployments to have similar roles, or ensure those roles
are mapped to similar operations.
Problem description
===================
OpenStack's initial implementation of RBAC was simple and worked for trivial
deployments. As OpenStack evolved and deployments started modeling larger, more
complex organizations, the RBAC implementation failed to evolve with it. As a
result, operators are stuck using existing tooling to provide the facade of a
more sophisticated RBAC solution. This is a confusing and incredibly tough
maintenance burden for operators who customize policy.
It's not uncommon to see various services hardcode operations to a specific
role. While the operation may require that role, the role to policy mapping
should be driven by policy defaults that can be overridden by operators instead
of hardcoding.
Proposed change
===============
As a platform, OpenStack should offer a basic, easy to understand RBAC
implementation with clear, reasonable default values. The process of
implementing this will give operators more flexibility out-of-the-box. It will
also be less likely to introduce inconsistencies across deployments due to the
limitations of the existing implementation.
To help ensure a graceful transition, `improvements
<http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/oslo-specs/specs/queens/policy-deprecation.html>`_
were made to the oslo policy library and a community `goal
<https://governance.openstack.org/tc/goals/queens/policy-in-code.html>`_ put in
place to help projects teams register defaults policies in code and provide
documentation. This work gives OpenStack project teams the tools necessary to
improve default role definitions. The changing defaults can be consumed by
operators in ways that are consistent with changing configuration options.
This specification proposes that Keystone enhance the basic RBAC experience
by incorporating the following default roles into its default policies.
Our goal is that this work will serve as a template which other services may
use to adopt the proposed default roles in a future `community goal
<https://governance.openstack.org/tc/goals/>`_.
Default Roles
-------------
**auditor**: It should only be used for read-only APIs and operations. Alternatively
referred to as ``reader``, this role fills an extremely popular need from operators.
**member**: serves as the
general purpose do-er role. It introduces granularity between the administrator(s)
and everyone else.
**admin**: This role will be only be considered appropriate for operations deemed too
sensitive for anyone with a member role.
The desired outcome of implementing the roles above is that projects should
start moving away from the practice of hardcoding operations to specific role
names. Instead, each policy should have a reasonable default that can be
overridden by operators.
Scope Type (Refresher)
----------------------
**project-scope**: Project-scope relates to authorization for operating in a
specific tenancy of the cloud.
**system-scope**: System-scope relates to authorization for operating with APIs that
do not map nicely to the concept of Project scope. It is **not** meant to cover *all*
APIs across a deployment. More information about system-scope can be found in the `specification
<http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/keystone-specs/specs/keystone/queens/system-scope.html>`_,
along with relevant historical context justifying the `need for system-scope
<https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/968696>`_.
Examples
--------
`auditor:`
An example project-scoped application of this role would be listing project tags (``identity:get_project_tags``).
An example system-scoped application of this role would be listing service endpoints
(``identity:list_endpoints``).
`member:`
An example project-scoped application of this role would be creating a project tag (``identity:update_project_tags``).
An example system-scope application of this role would be updating an endpoint
(``identity:update_endpoint``).
`admin:`
An example project-scoped administrator operation would be deleting project tags (``identity:delete_project_tags``).
An example system-scoped administrator operation would be creating an endpoint for a service
(``identity:create_endpoint``) or listing migrations (``os_compute_api:os-migrations``).
The following table is neither a final nor a comprehensive list of all possible rules/policies.
It serves merely as a snippet of existing rules to showcase how policies, scope, and the new
default roles can work together to provide a richer policy experience.
+-------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| | auditor | member | admin |
+=============+==============================+=================================+=================================+
| **Project** | * identity:list_project_tags | * identity:list_project_tags | * identity:list_project_tags |
| | * identity:get_project_tag | * identity:get_project_tag | * identity:get_project_tag |
| | | * identity:update_project_tags | * identity:update_project_tags |
| | | | * identity:create_project_tag |
| | | | * identity:delete_project_tags |
+-------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| **System** | * identity:list_endpoints | * identity:list_endpoints | * identity:list_endpoints |
| | * identity:get_endpoint | * identity:get_endpoint | * identity:get_endpoint |
| | | * identity:update_endpoint | * identity:update_endpoint |
| | | | * identity:create_endpoint |
| | | | * os_compute_api:os-hypervisors |
| | | | * os_compute_api:os-migrations |
+-------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
Example snippets of various policy files, or rendered snippets, could look like
the following.
.. note::
The default roles discussed will be created by Keystone, during the bootstrap process, using `implied roles
<https://docs.openstack.org/python-openstackclient/latest/cli/command-objects/implied_role.html>`_.
As indicated in the above table, having ``admin`` role implies a user also has the same rights as
the ``member`` role. Therefore this user will also has the same rights as the ``auditor`` role as
``member`` implies ``auditor``.
This keeps policy files clean. For example:
"identity:list_endpoints": "role:auditor OR role:member OR role:admin" is equivalent to
"identity:list_endpoints": "role:auditor" as a result of the implied roles chain.
The chain of implied roles will be documented alongside of the `policy-in-code defaults
<https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/master/keystone/common/policies/base.py>`_ in addition to
general Keystone documentation updates noting as much.
::
# scope_types = ('project')
"identity:list_project_tags": "role:auditor"
"identity:get_project_tag": "role:auditor"
"identity:update_project_tags": "role:member"
"identity:create_project_tag": "role:admin"
"identity:delete_project_tags": "role:admin"
# scope_types = ('system')
"identity:list_endpoints": "role:auditor"
"identity:get_endpoints": "role:auditor"
"identity:update_endpoint": "role:member"
"identity:create_endpoint": "role:admin"
"os_compute_api:os-hypervisors": "role:admin"
"os_compute_api:os-migrations": "role:admin"
Let's assume the following role assignment exist:
- **Alice** has role **auditor** on system
- **Bob** has the role **member** on system
- **Charlie** has role **admin** on system
- **Qiana** has role **auditor** on Project Alpha
- **Rebecca** has role **member** on Project Alpha
- **Steve** has role **admin** on Project Alpha
Given the above assignments and policies, the following would be possible:
**Alice** can list or retrieve specific endpoints. Alice cannot do any project specific
operations since her authorization is limited to the deployment system.
**Bob** can retrieve specific endpoints, list them, and update them. He cannot create new
endpoints, or delete existing ones. Bob cannot do any project specific operations because his
authorization is limited to the deployment system.
**Charlie** can retrieve specific endpoints, list, as well as create them. Additionally, Charlie
can list information on migrations as well as hypervisors. He cannot perform any project specific
operations because his authorization is limited to the deployment system.
**Qiana** can list all tags and get details about a specific tag within Project Alpha. She may not
perform system specific policies because her authorization is on a single project.
**Rebecca** can list all tags, get details about a specific tag, and update a tag within Project
Alpha. She cannot perform any system specific policies because her authorization is on a single
project.
**Steve** can list all tags, create new tags, get details about a specific tag, update a tag, and
delete tags within Project Alpha. He cannot perform any system specific policies because his
authorization is on a single project.
Risk Mitigation
---------------
**Scenario One -- A role serving the purposes described in this spec exists under another name**:
Let us assume that Deployment A already has ``Role X`` which serves the purpose of the proposed here as
the ``auditor`` role. In this instance, it is reasonable to assume that operators may have custom policy
work in place and do not want to port immediately.
This issue may be mitigated through the use of implied roles. Operators need simply to ensure that
``auditor`` implies ``Role X``. Please review the documentation on `implied roles
<https://docs.openstack.org/python-openstackclient/latest/cli/command-objects/implied_role.html>`_. for
specific instructions on how make one role imply another.
**Scenario Two -- An existing ``auditor``, ``member``, or ``admin`` role already exists**: Let us assume
that Deployment B already has a ``member`` role. Keystone will not attempt to overwrite any existing roles
that have been populated. It will instead note that a role with the name ``member`` already exists in log
output.
Alternatives
------------
reader/writer/admin vs auditor/member/admin. There was much debate regarding the naming
conventions for these roles. We have opted to use `auditor`, `member`, and `admin` as we
believe they most accurately describe their purpose when the context of OpenStack is taken
into consideration.
Implementation
==============
Assignee(s)
-----------
Primary assignee:
* Lance Bragstad lbragstad lbragstad@gmail.com
* Harry Rybacki hrybacki hrybacki@redhat.com
Work Items
----------
* Add ability for Keystone bootstrap to create proposed roles
* Implement auditor role across policies
* Implement member role across policies
* Implement admin role across policies
* Implement scope_types for all policies in Keystone
* Remove @protected decorator
* Document how operators may generate policy files with service specific roles
* Prepare Proof-of-Concept to demo and facilitate acceptance of an OpenStack Community Goal
to promote default roles across the other services.
Dependencies
============
This work is dependent on the following:
* `Registering and documenting
<https://governance.openstack.org/tc/goals/queens/policy-in-code.html>`_
all policies in code
The work detailed in this specification will be supplemented with policy work
being done in oslo and keystone:
* Implementing `system-scope
<http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/keystone-specs/specs/keystone/queens/system-scope.html>`_
in keystone
* Implementing `scope_types
<http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/oslo-specs/specs/queens/include-scope-in-policy.html>`_
Full dependencies and relevant work can be found in the `Policy Roadmap
<https://trello.com/b/bpWycnwa/policy-roadmap>`_.
Resources
=========
* `Policy Roadmap <https://trello.com/b/bpWycnwa/policy-roadmap>`_
* `System Scope <http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/keystone-specs/specs/keystone/queens/system-scope.html>`_
* `Deprecation with oslo.policy <http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/oslo-specs/specs/queens/policy-deprecation.html>`_
* `Scope types in oslo.policy <http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/oslo-specs/specs/queens/include-scope-in-policy.html>`_
* Previous `attempts <https://review.openstack.org/#/c/245629>`_ at providing
default roles
.. note::
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode