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security-doc
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Fix easily misinterpreted context 

Change-Id: Ied0e6abefe9956af8f3dd331be4dfc1d6d84e74b
Closes-Bug: 1343612
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KATO Tomoyuki 2014-08-05 13:55:40 +09:00
parent 0be1f0e0d1
commit 6fb6449b55
1 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
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security-guide/section_case-studies-messaging.xml
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xml:id="case-studies-messaging">
<?dbhtml stop-chunking?>
<title>Case studies</title>
<para>The message queue is a critical piece of infrastructure that supports a number of OpenStack services but is most strongly associated with the Compute service. Due to the nature of the message queue service, Alice and Bob have similar security concerns. One of the larger concerns that remains is that many systems have access to this queue and there is no way for a consumer of the queue messages to verify which host or service placed the messages on the queue. An attacker who is able to successfully place messages on the queue is able to create and delete VM instances, attach the block storage of any tenant and a myriad of other malicious actions. There are a number of solutions on the horizon to fix this, with several proposals for message signing and encryption making their way through the OpenStack development process.</para>
<para>The message queue is a critical piece of infrastructure that supports a number of OpenStack services but is most strongly associated with the Compute service. Due to the nature of the message queue service, Alice and Bob have similar security concerns. One of the larger concerns that remains is that many systems have access to this queue and there is no way for a consumer of the queue messages to verify which host or service placed the messages on the queue. An attacker who is able to successfully place messages on the queue is able to create and delete VM instances, attach the block storage of any tenant and a myriad of other malicious actions. There are a number of solutions anticipated in the near future, with several proposals for message signing and encryption making their way through the OpenStack development process.</para>
<section xml:id="case-studies-messaging-idp38416">
<title>Alice's private cloud</title>
<para>In this case Alice's controls mimic those Bob has deployed for the public cloud.</para>
<para>In this case, Alice's controls are the same as Bob's controls, which are described below.</para>
</section>
<section xml:id="case-studies-messaging-idp39920">
<title>Bob's public cloud</title>
<para>Bob assumes that at some point infrastructure or networks underpinning the Compute service may become compromised. Due to this, he recognizes the importance of locking down access to the message queue. To do this Bob deploys his RabbitMQ servers with SSL and X.509 client auth for access control. This in turn limits the capabilities of an attacker who has compromised a system that does not have queue access.</para>
<para>Bob assumes the infrastructure or networks underpinning the Compute service could become compromised, therefore he recognizes the importance of hardening the system by restricting access to the message queue. In order to accomplish this task Bob deploys his RabbitMQ servers with SSL and X.509 client auth for access control. Hardening activities assists in limiting the capabilities of a malicious user that has compromised the system by disallowing queue access, provided that this user does not have valid credentials to override the controls.</para>
<para>Additionally, Bob adds strong network ACL rulesets to enforce which endpoints can communicate with the message servers. This second control provides some additional assurance should the other protections fail.</para>
</section>
</section>