497 lines
21 KiB
Python
497 lines
21 KiB
Python
# Copyright 2012 OpenStack Foundation
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
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# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
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# a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
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# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
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# under the License.
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from swift.common import utils as swift_utils
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from swift.common.http import is_success
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from swift.common.middleware import acl as swift_acl
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from swift.common.request_helpers import get_sys_meta_prefix
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from swift.common.swob import HTTPNotFound, HTTPForbidden, HTTPUnauthorized
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from swift.common.utils import register_swift_info
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from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
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import functools
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PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID_HEADER = 'x-account-project-domain-id'
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PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID_SYSMETA_HEADER = \
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get_sys_meta_prefix('account') + 'project-domain-id'
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# a string that is unique w.r.t valid ids
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UNKNOWN_ID = '_unknown'
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class KeystoneAuth(object):
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"""Swift middleware to Keystone authorization system.
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In Swift's proxy-server.conf add this middleware to your pipeline::
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[pipeline:main]
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pipeline = catch_errors cache authtoken keystoneauth proxy-server
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Make sure you have the authtoken middleware before the
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keystoneauth middleware.
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The authtoken middleware will take care of validating the user and
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keystoneauth will authorize access.
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The authtoken middleware is shipped directly with keystone it
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does not have any other dependences than itself so you can either
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install it by copying the file directly in your python path or by
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installing keystone.
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If support is required for unvalidated users (as with anonymous
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access) or for formpost/staticweb/tempurl middleware, authtoken will
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need to be configured with ``delay_auth_decision`` set to true. See
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the Keystone documentation for more detail on how to configure the
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authtoken middleware.
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In proxy-server.conf you will need to have the setting account
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auto creation to true::
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[app:proxy-server]
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account_autocreate = true
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And add a swift authorization filter section, such as::
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[filter:keystoneauth]
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use = egg:swift#keystoneauth
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operator_roles = admin, swiftoperator
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This maps tenants to account in Swift.
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The user whose able to give ACL / create Containers permissions
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will be the one that are inside the ``operator_roles``
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setting which by default includes the admin and the swiftoperator
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roles.
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If you need to have a different reseller_prefix to be able to
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mix different auth servers you can configure the option
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``reseller_prefix`` in your keystoneauth entry like this::
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reseller_prefix = NEWAUTH
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The keystoneauth middleware supports cross-tenant access control using
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the syntax <tenant>:<user> in container Access Control Lists (ACLs). For
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a request to be granted by an ACL, <tenant> must match the UUID of the
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tenant to which the request token is scoped and <user> must match the
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UUID of the user authenticated by the request token.
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Note that names must no longer be used in cross-tenant ACLs because with
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the introduction of domains in keystone names are no longer globally
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unique. For backwards compatibility, ACLs using names will be granted by
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keystoneauth when it can be established that both the grantee and the
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tenant being accessed are either not yet in a domain (e.g. the request
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token has been obtained via the keystone v2 API) or are both in the
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default domain to which legacy accounts would have been migrated. The id
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of the default domain is specified by the config option
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``default_domain_id``:
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default_domain_id = default
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The backwards compatible behavior can be disabled by setting the config
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option ``allow_names_in_acls`` to false::
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allow_names_in_acls = false
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To enable this backwards compatibility, keystoneauth will attempt to
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determine the domain id of a tenant when any new account is created,
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and persist this as account metadata. If an account is created for a tenant
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using a token with reselleradmin role that is not scoped on that tenant,
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keystoneauth is unable to determine the domain id of the tenant;
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keystoneauth will assume that the tenant may not be in the default domain
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and therefore not match names in ACLs for that account.
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:param app: The next WSGI app in the pipeline
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:param conf: The dict of configuration values
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"""
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def __init__(self, app, conf):
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self.app = app
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self.conf = conf
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self.logger = swift_utils.get_logger(conf, log_route='keystoneauth')
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self.reseller_prefix = conf.get('reseller_prefix', 'AUTH_').strip()
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if self.reseller_prefix and self.reseller_prefix[-1] != '_':
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self.reseller_prefix += '_'
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self.operator_roles = conf.get('operator_roles',
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'admin, swiftoperator').lower()
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self.reseller_admin_role = conf.get('reseller_admin_role',
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'ResellerAdmin').lower()
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config_is_admin = conf.get('is_admin', "false").lower()
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self.is_admin = swift_utils.config_true_value(config_is_admin)
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config_overrides = conf.get('allow_overrides', 't').lower()
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self.allow_overrides = swift_utils.config_true_value(config_overrides)
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self.default_domain_id = conf.get('default_domain_id', 'default')
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self.allow_names_in_acls = swift_utils.config_true_value(
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conf.get('allow_names_in_acls', 'true'))
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def __call__(self, environ, start_response):
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identity = self._keystone_identity(environ)
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# Check if one of the middleware like tempurl or formpost have
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# set the swift.authorize_override environ and want to control the
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# authentication
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if (self.allow_overrides and
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environ.get('swift.authorize_override', False)):
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msg = 'Authorizing from an overriding middleware (i.e: tempurl)'
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self.logger.debug(msg)
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return self.app(environ, start_response)
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if identity:
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self.logger.debug('Using identity: %r', identity)
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environ['keystone.identity'] = identity
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environ['REMOTE_USER'] = identity.get('tenant')
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env_identity = self._integral_keystone_identity(environ)
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environ['swift.authorize'] = functools.partial(
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self.authorize, env_identity)
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user_roles = (r.lower() for r in identity.get('roles', []))
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if self.reseller_admin_role in user_roles:
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environ['reseller_request'] = True
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else:
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self.logger.debug('Authorizing as anonymous')
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environ['swift.authorize'] = self.authorize_anonymous
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environ['swift.clean_acl'] = swift_acl.clean_acl
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def keystone_start_response(status, response_headers, exc_info=None):
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project_domain_id = None
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for key, val in response_headers:
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if key.lower() == PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID_SYSMETA_HEADER:
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project_domain_id = val
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break
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if project_domain_id:
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response_headers.append((PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID_HEADER,
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project_domain_id))
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return start_response(status, response_headers, exc_info)
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return self.app(environ, keystone_start_response)
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def _keystone_identity(self, environ):
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"""Extract the identity from the Keystone auth component."""
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# In next release, we would add user id in env['keystone.identity'] by
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# using _integral_keystone_identity to replace current
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# _keystone_identity. The purpose of keeping it in this release it for
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# back compatibility.
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if environ.get('HTTP_X_IDENTITY_STATUS') != 'Confirmed':
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return
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roles = []
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if 'HTTP_X_ROLES' in environ:
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roles = environ['HTTP_X_ROLES'].split(',')
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identity = {'user': environ.get('HTTP_X_USER_NAME'),
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'tenant': (environ.get('HTTP_X_TENANT_ID'),
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environ.get('HTTP_X_TENANT_NAME')),
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'roles': roles}
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return identity
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def _integral_keystone_identity(self, environ):
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"""Extract the identity from the Keystone auth component."""
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if environ.get('HTTP_X_IDENTITY_STATUS') != 'Confirmed':
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return
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roles = []
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if 'HTTP_X_ROLES' in environ:
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roles = environ['HTTP_X_ROLES'].split(',')
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identity = {'user': (environ.get('HTTP_X_USER_ID'),
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environ.get('HTTP_X_USER_NAME')),
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'tenant': (environ.get('HTTP_X_TENANT_ID'),
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environ.get('HTTP_X_TENANT_NAME')),
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'roles': roles}
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token_info = environ.get('keystone.token_info', {})
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auth_version = 0
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user_domain = project_domain = (None, None)
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if 'access' in token_info:
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# ignore any domain id headers that authtoken may have set
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auth_version = 2
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elif 'token' in token_info:
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auth_version = 3
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user_domain = (environ.get('HTTP_X_USER_DOMAIN_ID'),
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environ.get('HTTP_X_USER_DOMAIN_NAME'))
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project_domain = (environ.get('HTTP_X_PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID'),
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environ.get('HTTP_X_PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME'))
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identity['user_domain'] = user_domain
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identity['project_domain'] = project_domain
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identity['auth_version'] = auth_version
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return identity
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def _get_account_for_tenant(self, tenant_id):
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return '%s%s' % (self.reseller_prefix, tenant_id)
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def _reseller_check(self, account, tenant_id):
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"""Check reseller prefix."""
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return account == self._get_account_for_tenant(tenant_id)
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def _get_project_domain_id(self, environ):
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info = get_account_info(environ, self.app, 'KS')
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domain_id = info.get('sysmeta', {}).get('project-domain-id')
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exists = is_success(info.get('status', 0))
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return exists, domain_id
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def _set_project_domain_id(self, req, path_parts, env_identity):
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'''
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Try to determine the project domain id and save it as
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account metadata. Do this for a PUT or POST to the
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account, and also for a container PUT in case that
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causes the account to be auto-created.
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'''
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if PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID_SYSMETA_HEADER in req.headers:
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return
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version, account, container, obj = path_parts
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method = req.method
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if (obj or (container and method != 'PUT')
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or method not in ['PUT', 'POST']):
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return
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tenant_id, tenant_name = env_identity['tenant']
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exists, sysmeta_id = self._get_project_domain_id(req.environ)
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req_has_id, req_id, new_id = False, None, None
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if self._reseller_check(account, tenant_id):
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# domain id can be inferred from request (may be None)
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req_has_id = True
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req_id = env_identity['project_domain'][0]
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if not exists:
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# new account so set a domain id
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new_id = req_id if req_has_id else UNKNOWN_ID
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elif sysmeta_id is None and req_id == self.default_domain_id:
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# legacy account, update if default domain id in req
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new_id = req_id
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elif sysmeta_id == UNKNOWN_ID and req_has_id:
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# unknown domain, update if req confirms domain
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new_id = req_id or ''
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elif req_has_id and sysmeta_id != req_id:
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self.logger.warn("Inconsistent project domain id: " +
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"%s in token vs %s in account metadata."
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% (req_id, sysmeta_id))
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if new_id is not None:
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req.headers[PROJECT_DOMAIN_ID_SYSMETA_HEADER] = new_id
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def _is_name_allowed_in_acl(self, req, path_parts, identity):
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if not self.allow_names_in_acls:
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return False
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user_domain_id = identity['user_domain'][0]
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if user_domain_id and user_domain_id != self.default_domain_id:
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return False
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proj_domain_id = identity['project_domain'][0]
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if proj_domain_id and proj_domain_id != self.default_domain_id:
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return False
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# request user and scoped project are both in default domain
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tenant_id, tenant_name = identity['tenant']
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version, account, container, obj = path_parts
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if self._reseller_check(account, tenant_id):
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# account == scoped project, so account is also in default domain
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allow = True
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else:
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# retrieve account project domain id from account sysmeta
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exists, acc_domain_id = self._get_project_domain_id(req.environ)
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allow = exists and acc_domain_id in [self.default_domain_id, None]
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if allow:
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self.logger.debug("Names allowed in acls.")
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return allow
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def _authorize_cross_tenant(self, user_id, user_name,
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tenant_id, tenant_name, roles,
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allow_names=True):
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"""Check cross-tenant ACLs.
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Match tenant:user, tenant and user could be its id, name or '*'
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:param user_id: The user id from the identity token.
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:param user_name: The user name from the identity token.
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:param tenant_id: The tenant ID from the identity token.
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:param tenant_name: The tenant name from the identity token.
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:param roles: The given container ACL.
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:param allow_names: If True then attempt to match tenant and user names
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as well as id's.
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:returns: matched string if tenant(name/id/*):user(name/id/*) matches
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the given ACL.
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None otherwise.
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"""
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tenant_match = [tenant_id, '*']
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user_match = [user_id, '*']
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if allow_names:
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tenant_match = tenant_match + [tenant_name]
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user_match = user_match + [user_name]
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for tenant in tenant_match:
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for user in user_match:
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s = '%s:%s' % (tenant, user)
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if s in roles:
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return s
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return None
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def authorize(self, env_identity, req):
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tenant_id, tenant_name = env_identity['tenant']
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user_id, user_name = env_identity['user']
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referrers, roles = swift_acl.parse_acl(getattr(req, 'acl', None))
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#allow OPTIONS requests to proceed as normal
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if req.method == 'OPTIONS':
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return
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try:
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part = req.split_path(1, 4, True)
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version, account, container, obj = part
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except ValueError:
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return HTTPNotFound(request=req)
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self._set_project_domain_id(req, part, env_identity)
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user_roles = [r.lower() for r in env_identity.get('roles', [])]
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# Give unconditional access to a user with the reseller_admin
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# role.
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if self.reseller_admin_role in user_roles:
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msg = 'User %s has reseller admin authorizing'
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self.logger.debug(msg, tenant_id)
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req.environ['swift_owner'] = True
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return
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# If we are not reseller admin and user is trying to delete its own
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# account then deny it.
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if not container and not obj and req.method == 'DELETE':
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# User is not allowed to issue a DELETE on its own account
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msg = 'User %s:%s is not allowed to delete its own account'
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self.logger.debug(msg, tenant_name, user_name)
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return self.denied_response(req)
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# cross-tenant authorization
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matched_acl = None
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if roles:
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allow_names = self._is_name_allowed_in_acl(req, part, env_identity)
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matched_acl = self._authorize_cross_tenant(user_id, user_name,
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tenant_id, tenant_name,
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roles, allow_names)
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if matched_acl is not None:
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log_msg = 'user %s allowed in ACL authorizing.'
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self.logger.debug(log_msg, matched_acl)
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return
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acl_authorized = self._authorize_unconfirmed_identity(req, obj,
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referrers,
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roles)
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if acl_authorized:
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return
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# Check if a user tries to access an account that does not match their
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# token
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if not self._reseller_check(account, tenant_id):
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log_msg = 'tenant mismatch: %s != %s'
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self.logger.debug(log_msg, account, tenant_id)
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return self.denied_response(req)
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# Check the roles the user is belonging to. If the user is
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# part of the role defined in the config variable
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# operator_roles (like admin) then it will be
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# promoted as an admin of the account/tenant.
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for role in self.operator_roles.split(','):
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role = role.strip()
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if role in user_roles:
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log_msg = 'allow user with role %s as account admin'
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self.logger.debug(log_msg, role)
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req.environ['swift_owner'] = True
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return
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# If user is of the same name of the tenant then make owner of it.
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if self.is_admin and user_name == tenant_name:
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self.logger.warning("the is_admin feature has been deprecated "
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"and will be removed in the future "
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"update your config file")
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req.environ['swift_owner'] = True
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return
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if acl_authorized is not None:
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return self.denied_response(req)
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# Check if we have the role in the userroles and allow it
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for user_role in user_roles:
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if user_role in (r.lower() for r in roles):
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log_msg = 'user %s:%s allowed in ACL: %s authorizing'
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self.logger.debug(log_msg, tenant_name, user_name,
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user_role)
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return
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return self.denied_response(req)
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def authorize_anonymous(self, req):
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"""
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Authorize an anonymous request.
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:returns: None if authorization is granted, an error page otherwise.
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"""
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try:
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part = req.split_path(1, 4, True)
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version, account, container, obj = part
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except ValueError:
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return HTTPNotFound(request=req)
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#allow OPTIONS requests to proceed as normal
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if req.method == 'OPTIONS':
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return
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is_authoritative_authz = (account and
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account.startswith(self.reseller_prefix))
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if not is_authoritative_authz:
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return self.denied_response(req)
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referrers, roles = swift_acl.parse_acl(getattr(req, 'acl', None))
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authorized = self._authorize_unconfirmed_identity(req, obj, referrers,
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roles)
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if not authorized:
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return self.denied_response(req)
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def _authorize_unconfirmed_identity(self, req, obj, referrers, roles):
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""""
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Perform authorization for access that does not require a
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confirmed identity.
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:returns: A boolean if authorization is granted or denied. None if
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a determination could not be made.
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"""
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# Allow container sync.
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if (req.environ.get('swift_sync_key')
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and (req.environ['swift_sync_key'] ==
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req.headers.get('x-container-sync-key', None))
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and 'x-timestamp' in req.headers):
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log_msg = 'allowing proxy %s for container-sync'
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self.logger.debug(log_msg, req.remote_addr)
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return True
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|
# Check if referrer is allowed.
|
|
if swift_acl.referrer_allowed(req.referer, referrers):
|
|
if obj or '.rlistings' in roles:
|
|
log_msg = 'authorizing %s via referer ACL'
|
|
self.logger.debug(log_msg, req.referrer)
|
|
return True
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
def denied_response(self, req):
|
|
"""Deny WSGI Response.
|
|
|
|
Returns a standard WSGI response callable with the status of 403 or 401
|
|
depending on whether the REMOTE_USER is set or not.
|
|
"""
|
|
if req.remote_user:
|
|
return HTTPForbidden(request=req)
|
|
else:
|
|
return HTTPUnauthorized(request=req)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def filter_factory(global_conf, **local_conf):
|
|
"""Returns a WSGI filter app for use with paste.deploy."""
|
|
conf = global_conf.copy()
|
|
conf.update(local_conf)
|
|
register_swift_info('keystoneauth')
|
|
|
|
def auth_filter(app):
|
|
return KeystoneAuth(app, conf)
|
|
return auth_filter
|