tacker/tacker/tests/unit/policies/base.py

168 lines
7.0 KiB
Python

# Copyright (C) 2024 NEC, Corp.
# All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
import copy
from oslo_log import log as logging
from oslo_utils.fixture import uuidsentinel as uuids
from tacker.common import exceptions
from tacker import context
from tacker.tests.unit import base
LOG = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class BasePolicyTest(base.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
super(BasePolicyTest, self).setUp()
self.admin_project_id = uuids.admin_project_id
self.project_id = uuids.project_id
self.other_project_id = uuids.project_id_other
# Create the user context with implied roles so that we can test
# each user's context for RBAC permission.
#
# Legacy admin user
self.legacy_admin_context = context.Context(
user_id="legacy_admin", project_id=self.admin_project_id,
roles=['admin', 'member', 'reader'])
# project scoped users
self.project_admin_context = context.Context(
user_id="project_admin", project_id=self.project_id,
roles=['admin', 'member', 'reader'])
self.project_member_context = context.Context(
user_id="project_member", project_id=self.project_id,
roles=['member', 'reader'])
self.project_reader_context = context.Context(
user_id="project_reader", project_id=self.project_id,
roles=['reader'])
self.project_foo_context = context.Context(
user_id="project_foo", project_id=self.project_id,
roles=['foo'])
self.other_project_member_context = context.Context(
user_id="other_project_member",
project_id=self.other_project_id,
roles=['member', 'reader'])
self.other_project_reader_context = context.Context(
user_id="other_project_member",
project_id=self.other_project_id,
roles=['reader'])
# system scoped users to check if system scope tokens are not
# allowed in new RBAC.
self.system_admin_context = context.Context(
user_id="admin", roles=['admin', 'member', 'reader'],
system_scope='all')
self.system_member_context = context.Context(
user_id="member", roles=['member', 'reader'],
system_scope='all')
self.system_reader_context = context.Context(
user_id="reader", roles=['reader'],
system_scope='all')
self.system_foo_context = context.Context(
user_id="foo", roles=['foo'],
system_scope='all')
self.all_contexts = [
self.legacy_admin_context, self.project_admin_context,
self.project_member_context, self.project_reader_context,
self.project_foo_context, self.other_project_member_context,
self.other_project_reader_context
]
def common_policy_check(self, authorized_contexts,
unauthorized_contexts, rule_name,
func, req, *arg, **kwarg):
# NOTE(gmann): When fatal=False is passed as a parameter
# then this function does not raise error instead return
# the responses for all contexts.
fatal = kwarg.pop('fatal', True)
authorized_response = []
unauthorize_response = []
def ensure_return(req, *args, **kwargs):
return func(req, *arg, **kwargs)
def ensure_raises(req, *args, **kwargs):
exc = self.assertRaises(
exceptions.PolicyNotAuthorized, func, req, *arg, **kwarg)
# NOTE(gmann): In case of multi-policy APIs, PolicyNotAuthorized
# exception can be raised from either of the policy so checking
# the error message, which includes the rule name, can mismatch.
# Tests verifying the multi policy can pass rule_name as None
# to skip the error message assert.
if rule_name is not None:
self.assertEqual(
"Policy doesn't allow %s to be performed." %
rule_name, exc.format_message())
# Verify all the context having allowed scope and roles pass
# the policy check.
for auth_context in authorized_contexts:
LOG.info("Testing authorized user: %s", auth_context.user_id)
req.environ['tacker.context'] = auth_context
_args = copy.deepcopy(arg)
_kwargs = copy.deepcopy(kwarg)
if not fatal:
authorized_response.append(
ensure_return(req, *_args, **_kwargs))
else:
func(req, *_args, **_kwargs)
# Verify all the context not having allowed scope or roles fail
# the policy check.
for unauth_context in unauthorized_contexts:
LOG.info("Testing unauthorized user: %s", unauth_context.user_id)
req.environ['tacker.context'] = unauth_context
_args = copy.deepcopy(arg)
_kwargs = copy.deepcopy(kwarg)
if not fatal:
try:
unauthorize_response.append(
ensure_return(req, *_args, **_kwargs))
# NOTE(gmann): We need to ignore the PolicyNotAuthorized
# exception here so that we can add the correct response
# in unauthorize_response for the case of fatal=False.
# This handle the case of multi policy checks where tests
# are verifying the second policy via the response of
# fatal-False and ignoring the response checks where the
# first policy itself fail to pass (even test override the
# first policy to allow for everyone but still, scope
# checks can leads to PolicyNotAuthorized error).
# For example: flavor extra specs policy for GET flavor
# API. In that case, flavor extra spec policy is checked
# after the GET flavor policy. So any context failing on
# GET flavor will raise the PolicyNotAuthorized and for
# that case we do not have any way to verify the flavor
# extra specs so skip that context to check in test.
except exceptions.PolicyNotAuthorized:
continue
else:
ensure_raises(req, *_args, **_kwargs)
return authorized_response, unauthorize_response